

First Principles Review of Defence
R2-1-CO68
Russell Offices
Department of Defence
CANBERRA BC ACT 2610

Gentlemen of the First Principles Review Committee,

The following First Principles are drawn from my 47 years of service.

These ten Principles form an inter-locking system from which an effective White paper can be compiled.

1. Australia's Military Forces should be perceived as so competent that no Nation or group will choose to make a military challenge.

My prospective father-in-law, Ralph Thompson, then Director of Signal Division and formerly Acting Secretary of Defence, taught me this in 1967 when I was Commander of the RAAF Academy Cadet squadron and courting his daughter.

He asked me what my role in the RAAF would be. My reply was that I would be so competent at air combat I would defeat the enemy. His reply was that the Australian Defence Force should be so competent that no military force would choose to engage us.

I have embraced this Principle for my entire tenure of military service.

2. Australia must be able to rely solely on its Military Forces for its security.

This was a prime consideration in the Defence 2000 White Paper, and has become substantially more important as the military capabilities of China, India and Russia increase while that of the USA decreases.

Even if the USA has the intent to assist Australia in times of a contingency threatening Australia and its National Interest, it will, at some time in the near future, lack the capability.

3. The ethos for members of Australia's Military Forces must be 'Service to the Nation before Self'.

My father-in-law also taught me this Principle. Sadly, after rejoining the RAAF in 1997, I saw this Principle invert and the ethos of self-service has prevailed since.

No military force can be effective when its members serve their own interest before that of the Nation they are sworn to serve, hence my inclusion of this Principle at the apex of First Principles as Military Culture is an essential component of a Nations Strategy.

4. Continuously monitor the capabilities and intent (threat = capability * intent) of possible adversaries and adapt the capabilities of Australia's Military Forces to counter the threat spectrum over time and well into the future.

I was involved with these activities in Capability Development Division in 1996, and between 2003 and 2007. Timeframes were 5 years and 15 years into the future in order to adapt the capabilities of the Force-in-being and the Future Force via the Defence Capability Plan respectively. My role was to represent the capabilities of possible adversaries (Red Force) and to war-game designated Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios.

5. First build an effective Combat Force, then make that Force as efficient as possible. (Structure for War, adapt for Peace.)

This issue arose when I was restructuring the RAAF after the 1996 Defence Reform Program. Certain elements of the Department were proposing to 'outsource' most military combat capabilities in the naïve expectation that they could be built when needed. There was no concept of warning time, or the need to deploy Forces for short-notice contingencies, and into locations where lethal enemies might be encountered.

One of my initiatives was to build Expeditionary Combat Support Squadrons (ECSSs) for the RAAF, the first of which was commissioned and deployed for the defence of East Timor. ECSSs have been in continuous use since.

6. The first and prime consideration for selection of equipment for Australia's Military Forces must be the contribution it makes to Military Capability.

This is in part a sub-set of the previous Principle, but needs emphasis to avoid the adverse outcomes of putting the commercial cart before the capability horse.

The Joint Strike Fighter project illustrates the threat to Australia's future security by ignoring Principles 2, 4 and 6. This aircraft was specified by the Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 2002 to be an inexpensive interdiction aircraft with some self-protection capabilities.

The aircraft has been 'rebadged' (but not re-designed,) as an air superiority aircraft, a capability essential to Australia's future security that the JSF can never deliver.

This truth was acknowledged by the Commander of USAF's Air Combat Command earlier this year:

[Interview with Commander USAF Air Combat Command](#)

He said: *"If I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant. The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform. It needs the F-22."*

The fact that Australia does not have an aircraft with the capability of the F-22 leads to the logical conclusion that the proposed F-35 fleet will be *'irrelevant'* and as a consequence there is a huge gap in Australia's future Military capabilities.

The Russian Sukhoi T-50 will be exported to India; the Sukhoi Su-35S possibly to Indonesia; the Chinese Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31 will be deployed in China's Military Forces and possibly be exported. The T-50, J-20 and J-31 will have 'F-22 like' capabilities.

Adopting First Principles 2, 4 and 6 demands an urgent re-assessment of the capability of the F-35 JSF to deliver the Regional air superiority that Australia requires for its future security and possibly its sovereignty.

7. Adopt a *'Whole-of-Government'* policy for the security of the Nation.

This policy has been implemented in part, but substantial increases in capability, effectiveness and efficiency would be delivered from a complete implementation. Examples are gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, net assessment of futures, military aid to the civilian power in times of national disasters, aid from the civilian power to Australia's Military Forces in times of a military contingency.

8. Building the capabilities and operation of Australia's Military Forces should foster Australian Industry and Commerce and vice-versa.

This is a '*Whole-of-Nation*' approach to the funding and support of Military operations. A General Equilibrium Economic test should be applied, together with vulnerabilities to self-reliance and security when exposed to supplies of military goods from sources external to Australia (Principle 2).

The most perverse impact on Australian industry and commerce that Defence has imposed is the *Defence Trade Control Act 2012* and the associated *Strategic Goods List*. When fully implemented, this Act puts Australia's \$10+ Billion Education Export businesses at risk, and will force many enterprises with 'dual use' activities to cease operations.

The Act needs substantial amendment, especially the onus-of-proof provisions which are '*un-Australian*' in intent and operation.

9. Reframe 'Australian Defence Force' to 'Australian Military Force'.

The label '*Defence*' narrows the perception and employment of a large and essential Government capability.

The US has a 'D-I-M-E' (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) model that integrates military capabilities into the statecraft they employ:


[D-I-M-E Statecraft](#)

'D-I-M-E' was a core concept in the Multi-Nation-Interagency-Group project (US, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Australia) for which I wrote the Concept of Operations in 2005.

10. Each non-combatant member of Australia's Military Forces (which includes civilians) should add more value than their full cost.

There is massive duplication and triplication (and worse if a Whole-of-Government & Nation approach is adopted) in the current Australian Defence Organization structure. Testing and pruning the organizational structure will deliver substantial savings that can be reinvested into Military Capabilities.

Permission to Publish: I grant the Committee the right to publish this submission in full.

A square image showing a handwritten signature in blue ink on a light-colored background. The signature is cursive and appears to read 'Chris Mills'.

(Mr) Chris Mills, AM, MSc, BSc